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Abstract: The long-term trends of urbanization suggest: not only have more cities formed, but the
leading metropolises have grown larger, with a number of peripheral subcenters developing over
time. Conventional models of urban growth are limited, in that commuting cost and congestion
eventually result in decreasing returns in a monocentric city as population becomes very large. We
construct a general-equilibrium model with dynamic interactions between spatial agglomeration and
urban development, driven by location-dependent knowledge spillovers. Our contribution allows
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1 Introduction
There have been long-term trends of urbanization and city growth across developed and developing
countries over the past two centuries. Not only have more cities formed, but the leading metropolises
have grown larger over time. Conventional endogenous urban growth models characterize this long-
term trend in a canonical infinite-horizon framework with a monocentric city structure.1 One may
inquire: given limited land or increasing total commuting cost in a monocentric city with localization
externalities and increasing consumer population, how can we explain continual growth of city
populations? After all, one would expect diminishing returns to set in eventually with higher
population. Our answer to this question is the formation of satellite subcenters. The primary
purpose to this paper is to propose and solve a model with the following features:
• There is an externality in capital usage that aﬀects production and depends on both the
overall geographical distribution of firms within a city as well as a particular firm’s location
in the distribution.
• The model is purely competitive. There are no developers, and cooperative behavior on the
part of firms is excluded.
• The model is dynamic in the sense that population grows, whereas agents have perfect fore-
sight. This, together with full depreciation of capital, boils down to period-by-period opti-
mization of agents with population change.
• The model is analytically solvable.
• The equilibrium of the model features endogenous subcenter formation as population grows.
• The firms do not own land, so it is unnecessary to reward them with increased land rents as
a result of capitalization of the knowledge externality when they form a new subcenter.
A better understanding of the emergence of subcenters is useful for developing transportation,
local industrial and urban land use policy. Moreover, it is important to understand the role of
geography in economic growth, and vice-versa.
Many large metropolises feature a core central city together with a number of peripheral sub-
centers. For example, McMillen and Smith (2003) provide a careful empirical documentation of
1See Berliant and Wang (2004) for a detailed review of exogenous and endogenous urban growth models.
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such urban structures. They find that most U.S. cities have multiple subcenters, with as many as
46 subcenters in Los Angeles.2 Although there have been attempts at modeling this core-periphery
urban structure in a static set up without population growth (see Abdel-Rahman and Wang, 1995,
and papers cited therein), a complete characterization of the competitive formation of subcen-
ters within an endogenous urban boundary framework remains unexplored. Thus, our paper also
contributes to the conventional core-periphery literature.
The modeling strategy is as follows. We construct a competitive spatial equilibrium model with
households and firms residing in a linear city with continual exogenous growth of population and
expansion of city boundaries. Following the pivotal work by Ogawa and Fujita (1980) and Fujita
and Ogawa (1982) (hereafter referred to as FO), we incorporate positive inter-firm production
externalities that decrease with distance between the firms. Using the structure proposed in the
fixed population, closed city setup by Berliant, Peng and Wang (2002) (hereafter referred to as
BPW), we measure this geographically diminishing eﬀect by both Euclidean distance to the mean
of the distribution of firms and an overall firm dispersion index. In addition to using land, firms
employ labor and capital to produce a single homogeneous good, maximizing profits. Households
choose workplaces and residences to maximize utility. Capital is fully depreciated, so the choice
variables of agents (all with perfect foresight) have no eﬀect on state variables, which greatly
simplifies the analysis. In competitive equilibrium, the allocation of goods and factors, the locational
choice of firm sites and household residences, and factor prices and land rents are all endogenously
determined.
The results derived for this model are as follows. When commuting cost for additional pop-
ulation exceeds production benefits from additional population, one would expect to see urban
growth subsiding. Given the costs and benefits, we could need coordination between producers and
consumers to achieve this (localization benefits for producers and commuting cost for consumers
is the trade-oﬀ). But with a wage gradient, we might not — the producers could be making the
decision about a new subcenter in a decentralized way, since they are paying the commuting cost
indirectly through the wage. So exogenous population growth, an endogenous city boundary, a
simplified localization externality, commuting costs, and a wage gradient are the key ingredients of
the model. The idea is that as population expands, the city boundary moves out (given consumer
2Other large cities, such as New York, Chicago and Washington D.C., have 10—38 subcenters. St. Louis, where the
authors reside, has 5 subcenters. Nashville and Salt Lake City are among the very few cities featuring a monocentric
urban structure with no subcenters.
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demand for land is inelastic), thus commuting cost gets large, so land rent and the wage are rela-
tively small for locations distant from firms. Eventually, some firms will decide to move into a gap.
Formation of a subcenter can be better than the formation of a new city from the point of view
of production eﬃciency, because of the presence of localization externalities. Formally, we prove
the existence of symmetric competitive spatial equilibrium, establishing necessary and suﬃcient
conditions to support either a monocentric or a core-periphery urban configuration and deriving
analytically the corresponding equilibrium wage and land rent schedules. To us, the most surprising
aspect of this project is that one doesn’t have to assume that the firms own shares in land rent in
order to induce them to form subcenters endogenously in equilibrium. They will do so willingly, in
a noncooperative fashion, without enjoying the benefits of land value capitalization around them.
There is no government or developer in the model who can see rents and coordinate agents to take
action. The absentee landlord, completely passive in the model, is the only agent that benefits
from higher land rents. In the dynamic process of urban development in response to exogenous
population growth, eventually the monocentric equilibrium disappears, but the equilibrium with a
core-periphery urban configuration appears and survives for a while. This latter result may serve
to explain why the monocentric urban structure is rarely seen today in U.S. cities.
Related Literature
Our work builds on BPW in two important respects. First, BPW is static, whereas the current
paper is dynamic. In particular, we allow population to grow (at a constant rate) and the city
boundary to expand accordingly to accommodate the expanding population (at the same rate
under the linear city setup). Second, while BPW examine the possibilities of monocentric, mixed
and duocentric urban structures, the current paper considers the formation of a core-periphery
tricentric urban configuration, that has been largely ignored in the theoretical literature on city
formation. In contrast with both our previous work and most of the previous literature, we consider
asymmetric urban structures where centers and subcenters do not have the same number of firms
and do not employ the same number of workers.
Our paper is obviously related to the subcenter formation literature, specifically studies by
Henderson and Slade (1993), Henderson and Mitra (1996), and Fujita, Thisse and Zenou (1997).3
In Henderson and Slade, it is the developers who try to form competing subcenters. In Henderson
3The reader is referred to a survey paper by Anas, Arnott and Small (1998) that contains a good discussion of
subcenters from both the theoretical and empirical points of view.
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and Mitra and Fujita, Thisse and Zenou, subcenters are formed in initially peripheral locations due
to the establishment of new plants set up by a large (non-competitive) firm that has a dominant
employment share.4 We wish to emphasize, however, that, in contrast with these papers, we
use a competitive framework. In addition to this key diﬀerence in modeling strategies concerning
subcenter formation, the firms in our paper do not capture the benefits of location capitalized into
land rents (particularly when a subcenter forms), whereas such benefits are necessary in the other
papers to obtain subcenter formation.
There are several important points to be made in relating our model to the broader literature.
First, the FO framework, that was at least 20 years ahead of its time, employs a form of production
externality for each firm that relies on the pairwise distance between a given firm and any other
firm. Using numerical simulations, they find equilibria with multiple symmetric centers (each
with the same number of firms) and conclude that both population and commuting cost play
important roles in determining the number of subcenters in equilibrium, though equilibrium is far
from unique. In contrast, our model has centers with diﬀerent numbers of firms, is close to having an
analytical solution (we employ numerical simulations at the very end to extract a characterization
of equilibrium), and takes a more conservative view of the production externality, biased away
from subcenter formation. That is, our externality function measures the distance from the mean
location of firms (generally the middle of the set of locations) to any particular firm, and the
overall dispersion of firms. Thus, subcenters are less likely to form, since the externality gives
no weight to the local density of firms. Nevertheless, we obtain endogenous subcenter formation
without developers or government. Naturally, due to the production externality, our model yields
equilibrium allocations that are not first best.
Relative to the literature on the new economic geography (NEG), as exposited by Krugman
(1993), Fujita and Krugman (1995) and Fujita and Mori (1997), our model of course relies on an
explicit production externality rather than a pecuniary one with imperfect competition.5 Naturally,
4Both papers use the Fujita (1989) open city framework. While the former uses simulations, the latter produces
analytical solutions.
5See Baldwin and Forslid (2000) and Fujita and Thisse (2002) for more recent applications of the NEG model. One
may relate our study of subcenter formation to NEG models of city formation in a system of cities. In these models,
each city is specialized in producing a fixed and limited set of varieties (possibly one) and each firm is specialized
in producing one variety. Thus, by assumption, as the number of firms grows, the number of cities also grows (see,
e.g., Anas and Xiong, 2003). Moreover, as in most variety models, there is a scale eﬀect in the sense that a larger
economy with larger employment is associated with a greater number of varieties. So, by construction, an increase in
4
their extended comparative statics exercises are similar in spirit to ours, as is the result obtaining
an endogenous core-periphery structure; they must work harder to get this result, often resorting
to numerical simulations, due partly to the large number of equilibria in their model. Generally
speaking, the NEG model is one of regions rather than the internal structure of a city. No doubt
externalities are stronger for firms within the same city than for firms in diﬀerent cities but in
the same region; Rosenthal and Strange (2003) find that production externalities are in reality
quite localized. Moreover, our framework can be used to generate subcenters of diﬀerent sizes, in
contrast with the population symmetry that is ubiquitous in NEG models.6 Our model allows
analysis of the relationship between the emergence of subcenters and the interactions among firms
via knowledge spillovers. Furthermore, in contrast with most of NEG models, we do not rely
exclusively on numerical simulations.
Finally, Lucas and Rossi-Hansberg (2002) is related to our work in terms of the questions asked,
but we use a diﬀerent type of externality (both in functional form and by using capital instead of
labor) as well as a diﬀerent closure of the model, namely we have exogenous population and an
endogenous border while their model is the other way around. To be more specific, in our model we
have both capital and labor while their model has only labor. We simplify the land market relative
to their model by assuming that land demand is inelastic for all agents. Our externality is based on
capital usage by firms, whereas theirs is based on labor usage. Their externality accounts for pair-
wise labor usage and pairwise distance between firms, whereas ours relies on distance to the mean
location of firms and the distribution of capital use. We use assumptions on primitives, whereas
they use some assumptions on objects that are not primitive. We solve our model analytically
whereas they solve theirs computationally. Their model is static whereas ours is at least partially
dynamic. Finally, we take population as exogenous and derive the equilibrium utility level of con-
sumers endogenously. They take the utility level as exogenous and allow population to migrate
in or out of the city. This last diﬀerence is important, because in urban models typically indirect
utility is not a monotonic function of population. In general, it has at least one peak (usually called
a “utility hill”) and could have multiple peaks. So there is usually not a unique equilibrium level
of population corresponding to an equilibrium utility level. In many other respects, the contrast
population also leads to more cities (see, e.g., Anas, 2004).
6For example, the spatial configuration in Anas (2004) is a system of identical cities with the number and size
endogenously determined. The configurations in Anas and Xiong (2003) are monocentric, duocentric and multicentric
with cities of identical size.
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between their work and ours is similar to the contrast between FO and ours. Generally speaking,
equilibrium in all of these models is second best, due to externalities or other forms of market
failure.
2 The Basic Model
Both time and location are continuous; they are indexed by t and z, respectively. The spatial
economy features a long, narrow metropolitan area (MSA) over a featureless line Ω ≡ [−B,B],
with uniformly distributed land. The borders, represented by the variable B, are endogenously
determined. We will use agricultural land rent to determine the city boundary and thus to close
the model. This MSA boundary variable B will increase with the population of the MSA, but
that will be a result, not an assumption. We restrict our attention to the case of only one core in
the spatial economy. Without loss of generality, we let location z = 0 indicate the pre-determined
central business district (CBD) of the core prior to the development of satellite subcenters at the
fringes of the MSA. One may imagine location z = 0 as downtown Los Angeles. The western
boundary of the city is limited by the Pacific Ocean, the eastern boundary by mountains. One can
visualize locations of satellite subcenters such as Anaheim and Pasadena when the border of the
Los Angeles MSA stretched out as its population grew. Limits of such growth to the east were
initially given by the coastal mountain range, though recent development has occurred in the range
and beyond.
Index all of the variables by time t, denoted by E(t) for any variable E. There is a continuum
of infinitely lived firms of mass M and a continuum of infinitely lived households of mass N > 0.
For simplicity, we assume that the mass of firms is fixed (no entry) and that the mass of households
grows at an exogenous constant rate ν > 0:7
N(t) = N(0)eνt (1)
where the initial population is normalized to unity: N(0) = 1.
There is an absentee landlord who owns all the land (of measure 2B), collects the total land
rent (TLR), and consumes no land. As the population grows, the city boundary will expand. As
we will show below, each household or firm occupies a unit density of land in equilibrium. As a
7One may allow M to grow without altering the main conclusions of the paper.
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consequence, the absence of vacant land yields the following identity:
B(t) =
M +N(t)
2
(2)
Each firm rents land from the landlord, rents capital (K) from households and employs labor (L)
to produce a single homogeneous final good (Y ) using a Cobb-Douglas technology. The output of
final goods can be distributed to workers (wages), capital owners (capital rentals) and land owners
(land rents). Each household supplies a unit density of labor endowment inelastically and chooses
both workplace and residence to maximize lifetime utility. The absentee landlord’s behavior is
passive, simply spending the given total land rents, TLR, for final good consumption. Both factor
and goods markets are perfectly competitive, and each factor is fully employed in equilibrium.
The urban configuration could be concentrated or dispersed. A typical concentrated urban
configuration is monocentric, where the MSA features a core without any subcenters. Several types
of dispersed urban configurations have been studied in the literature related to urban productivity
spillovers (see FO and BPW), including (i) completely mixed (firms and households are uniformly
mixed at all locations), (ii) incompletely mixed (firms and households are mixed at some locations),
and (iii) duocentric (firms are located at clusters in the outskirts of the MSA). BPW show that
under their location-dependent knowledge-spillover framework, the duocentric urban configuration
cannot emerge in competitive general equilibrium.8 However, whether a core-periphery tricentric
urban structure may form remains unexplored. This latter urban configuration is the focus of our
paper in the dispersed case.
We use subscript τ to denote the type of urban configuration, where the MSA is either mono-
centric (τ = M) or core-periphery tricentric (τ = C).9 The densities of households and firms at
each location z under an equilibrium configuration τ are denoted by nτ (z) and mτ (z), respectively.
We will find conditions on exogenous parameters such that an initial urban configuration is mono-
centric, where firms are clustered within an interval [−q, q] ⊂ Ω, with a uniform density of firms
mτ = 1. Thus, we have:
q =
M
2
(3)
Fix a time t. We inquire whether it is possible for two satellite subcenters to form at locations
8The intuition for the result is that under a possible duocentric urban equilibrium configuration with the externality
dependent on the proximity of a firm to the mean location of firms, any firm in one of the two centers will want to
move to the mean location, thus disrupting the potential equilibrium.
9Note that if M is not a subscript, then it denotes the exogenous mass of firms.
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−D and D, where D is endogenously determined, away from the original center 0 toward the MSA
fringes. More specifically, we restrict our attention to the symmetric core-periphery urban structure
where all satellite subcenters are alike. For illustrative purposes, consider the possibility that the
two satellite subcenters of equal size at −D and D together absorb half of the firms. This MSA
therefore features an old city center (the core), with more firms (M/2) than each of the two satellite
subcenters (the periphery, with M/4 firms each).10 The core is now an interval [−q1, q1] ⊂ Ω,
whereas the two satellite subcenters are represented by [−q4,−q3] and [q3, q4]. Workers residing in
[−q2,−q1] ∪ [q1, q2] commute to the core and those in [−B,−q4] ∪ [−q3,−q2] and [q2, q3] ∪ [q4, B]
commute to satellite subcenters −D and D, respectively. Under this core-periphery urban structure
with uniform firm density mτ = 1, it is not diﬃcult to derive:
D(t) =
3
4
B(t)
q1(t) =
M
4
; q2(t) =
B(t)
2
=
M +N(t)
4
(4)
q3(t) =
3
4
B(t)− M
8
=
2M + 3N(t)
8
; q4(t) = B(t)−
1
8
N(t) =
4M + 3N(t)
8
For the rest of the paper, we will suppress the time index whenever it does not cause confusion.
2.1 Location-Dependent Knowledge Spillovers
Uncompensated inter-firm knowledge spillovers occur within the MSA. Thus, the aggregate capital
stock of all firms located in the city, denoted K, has positive eﬀects on the individual production
of each firm. To capture the stylized facts documented by Jacobs (1969), we allow the magnitude
of knowledge spillovers to diminish with distance.11 Specifically, we assume that such spatially
dependent knowledge spillovers take the form constructed by BPW: the eﬀective spillovers in the
MSA are a fraction of K with the fraction depending on the mean location and the dispersion of
firm sites.
Under a particular MSA configuration τ , define the mean location of firm sites in S ⊆ Ω
as μτ =
R
z∈S zmτ (z)dz, and the dispersion index of firm sites as στ . The dispersion index is
10Specifically, we guess an urban configuration and then verify that under some parameter values that this urban
configuration arises in equilibrium. Of course, there are other core-periphery urban configurations with diﬀerent
geographical distributions of firms that can arise under diﬀerent sets of parameters.
11Berliant, Reed and Wang (2006) attempt to provide microstructure for localization externalities, while Saxenian
(1994) gives anecdotal evidence of their importance.
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measured by two times the absolute deviation: στ = 2M
R
z∈Smτ (z) |z − μτ | dz,12 that satisfies
the desired properties of absoluteness (invariance to adding a constant to every firm’s location),
decomposability (into subgroups with subgroup consistency), and symmetry (to the mean location).
In the case of a monocentric MSA with uniform firm density mτ = 1, the set of firm sites is
S = [−q, q], the mean location of firm sites is μM = 0, and the dispersion index of firm sites can
be computed as:
σM =
4
M
Z q
0
µ
M
2q
¶
|z − 0| dz = q = M
2
. (5)
Let the subscript C denote the core-periphery tricentric configuration. When the urban structure of
the MSA is core-periphery with uniform firm density mτ = 1, we have: S = [−q4,−q3]∪ [−q1, q1]∪
[q3, q4], μC = 0, and noting that q3 = q4 − M4 ,
σC =
4
M
∙Z q1
0
mτ |z − 0| dz +
Z q4
q3
mτ |z − 0| dz
¸
= q4 = B −
N
8
. (6)
One can therefore see that our dispersion index values under the two urban structures of interest
are quite simple.
We now turn to inter-firm knowledge spillovers. By following the setup in BPW, we measure
the degree of eﬀective spillovers of firm interactions between a particular firm z ∈ S and the others
in the MSA given a configuration of type τ as follows:
Qτ (z) =
£
B2 − (z − μτ )2
¤
+
£
B2 − εσ2τ
¤
= 2B2 − (z − μτ )2 − εσ2τ > 0 (7)
where ε indicates the exogenous degree of penalty on the dispersion of firms within the MSA. We
subscript the index by τ to denote the configuration.
Two remarks are in order. First, thisQ function should be viewed as a proxy (using only the first
and second moments of the distribution of firms) for the overall (locational) distribution of firms. It
captures the Shell (1966)-Romer (1986) type of uncompensated spillovers based on an aggregation
of individual measures. Its simplicity enables us to obtain analytical results, relying as little as
possible on numerical examples. As Q is strictly concave in z, the penalty for firm dispersion must
be strictly convex in z. In this regard, our setup is consistent with the transactions cost setup in
Ogawa and Fujita (1980) and the locational potential function setup in Fujita and Ogawa (1982),
though the form of this external factor and also its interaction with the production factor inputs as
specified below are entirely diﬀerent. Second, this measure of eﬀective spillovers of firm interactions
12As in BPW, it is convenient to multiply the standard index by 2 in order to keep expressions simple.
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within the particular MSA depends crucially on the configuration of the urban structure, via both
the mean location and the dispersion of firm sites.13 In the two urban configurations to be studied
in this paper (monocentric and core-periphery), we have urban structures that are locationally
symmetric around zero. As a consequence, the mean locations do not play any role in diﬀerentiating
the two configurations (μM = μC = 0). However, since the creation of the two satellite subcenters
to form a core-periphery urban structure (from an originally monocentric MSA) enlarges firm
dispersion (σC = B − N8 > q = σM), it reduces the MSA-wide positive production externalities
(QC(z) < QM(z) for all z ∈ S) and gives the core-periphery urban configuration a disadvantage on
the basis of uncompensated spillovers.
2.2 A Firm’s Optimization Problem
By employing a density a(z) of land with capital K and labor L, a firm located at z ∈ S in an
MSA of configuration type τ can produce a single final good in quantity Yτ (z). The production
technology takes the Cobb-Douglas form:
Yτ (z) = AKαLβ[Qτ (z)K]1−α−βΘ(z)1−α−β (8)
where α, β ∈ (0, 1), α + β ∈ (0, 1), and Θ(z) measures the eﬀective land input given by Θ(z) =
min{1, θ(z)} with θ(z) = a(z) for all a(z) ≥ 1 and θ(z) = 0 for all a(z) < 1. The uncompensated
spillovers in firm production, measured by Qτ (z)K, are taken as given by each individual firm.
Moreover, the specification of the use of land implies that whenever a firm is operating (i.e.,
Yτ (z) > 0) in equilibrium, its land input must be: a(z) = 1. This “fixed lot size” setup not only
simplifies the analysis greatly, but also distinguishes out model from others because we allow for
factor substitution between labor and capital that is not present in FO.14
The output of the final good is taken as the numéraire. Denote by R(z) the land rent at location
z, and denote by r and w(z) the rental cost of capital and the wage rate, respectively. We assume
that capital is freely mobile, implying that capital rent is constant across locations; yet, wages
13Thus, the magnitude of this production externality is based only on the average or aggregation of the capital
stocks of individual firms as a consequence of uncompensated knowledge spillovers.
14 In equilibrium, the production technology is constant returns to scale with respect to all private factor inputs
{K,L,Θ}. The production technology is also constant returns to scale with respect to labor and capital together,
{L,K,K}. Thus, our model is readily extended to a dynamic framework with endogenous growth by following the
setup in Romer (1986).
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may vary with location. Each incumbent firm maximizes its value, defined as the integral of flow
profits discounted by the market rental rate, given the production technology (8) and market prices
{R(z), r, w(z)}:
max
K,L,z
Πτ (z) = AKαLβ[Qτ (z)K]1−α−β − rK − w(z)L−R(z). (9)
The profit optimization problem of the firm has several implications. First, equilibrium profit
for any active firm must be non-negative, since the firm can always elect not to produce. Second,
equilibrium profit must be the same for all active firms. If profits were higher for some firm, then
the firm with lower profit can imitate one with higher profit. This implies that equilibrium profit
is the same across locations occupied by firms. In fact, there will be a continuum of equilibria,
each with a diﬀerent, non-negative profit for firms that is constant across locations, and generally
diﬀerent values of B. We select the zero-profit equilibrium for three reasons. First, it simplifies
calculations because we do not have to carry a constant though the equations and worry about the
distribution of profits to households. Second, it would represent the equilibrium of a larger model
where free entry were allowed. Third, and most importantly, it is a competitive spatial equilibrium
in which the firms do not capture the benefits of location capitalized in land rents (particularly
when a subcenter forms). This latter feature diﬀerentiates our approach from those in the subcenter
development literature cited in the introduction. With zero profit in equilibrium, we can define the
bid rent function of a firm as:
RF (z) = max
K,L
AKαLβ[Qτ (z)K]1−α−β − rK − w(z)L. (10)
Under perfect competition, the land rent paid by each firm will be equal to the bid rent in equi-
librium at all locations occupied by firms. Incumbent firms make their choice of production site
facing the trade-oﬀs between the land rent, labor costs and the external benefit from knowledge
spillovers.
The first-order conditions with respect to K, L and z, respectively, can be derived as:
α
Y
K
= r (11)
β
Y
L
= w(z) (12)
−2(1− α− β) Y
Qτ (z)
(z − μτ ) = R0F (z) +w0(z)Lτ (13)
Obviously, (11) and (12) equate the marginal products of capital and labor with the corresponding
factor prices. Equation (13) is a locational equilibrium condition for firms (which is analogous to
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the Muth-Mills Condition in the context of a household’s residential choice). It states that the
knowledge-spillover gain from moving marginally closer to a central location is exactly oﬀset by the
increased land rent and labor cost.
Over time, firms in an initially monocentric MSA need to make one more locational decision:
whether or not to set up two satellite subcenters and to relocate accordingly. Given that all firms
are identical and there are no new entrants, this choice boils down to a choice between the existing
monocentric MSA and the core-periphery MSA while maintaining zero profit. Implicitly, one may
imagine the decision of firms in a two stage game. The first stage is the discrete locational choice
between setting up a firm site in the core or the periphery. The second stage is the standard point-
in-time profit maximization problem. To satisfy subgame perfection, the second stage problem is
solved first, followed by the first stage of discrete locational choice. When all firms choose to be in
the core, the equilibrium urban configuration is monocentric; when half of the firms choose to be
in the two subcenters, the equilibrium urban configuration is core-periphery.
There are two reasons we use a dynamic game, where agents have no market power. First, we
wish to study what happens when population grows exogenously over time. Second, in order to
allow firms to coordinate actions in a non-cooperative game structure with perfect foresight, and
shift between the monocentric and core-periphery structures, it’s useful to have dynamics. Most
important, the location of a new subcenter is chosen by a group of firms in a self-fulfilling fashion
as in the dynamic macroeconomic literature, though it is completely consistent with standard
microeconomics. All firms behave noncooperatively and are rational. In anticipating 14 of the firms
moving to each of the two subcenters at a particular time and 12 of the firms staying, a mover will
find it optimal to move and a firm staying will find it optimal to stay. In equilibrium, it turns out
that the configuration is exactly as anticipated and the expectations are self-fulfilling. Under this
equilibrium notion, there is no need for collective action or a collective decision to form subcenters.
Formally, this is noncooperative behavior that can appear to be cooperative.
2.3 A Household’s Optimization Problem
All households are identical in every respect. Each household is endowed with one unit of labor
every instant in time, receiving no disutility from work and thus supplying one unit of labor
inelastically. Each household has an instantaneous felicity function given by eu(c, h), where c is the
final good consumption and h is residential land consumption. Assume eu(c, h) = u(c) for all h ≥ 1
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and eu(c, h) = 0 for all h < 1, where u(c) is strictly increasing and concave in c with u(0) = 0.
As a consequence, each optimizing household would consume exactly one unit of land and we can
simply restrict our attention to the eﬀective utility function, u(c).
Given a constant rate of time preference ρ > 0, the lifetime utility of an infinitely lived household
can therefore be specified as: U({c(t)}t∈[0,∞)) =
R∞
0 u(c(t))e
−ρtdt. For analytic convenience, assume
that new capital is fully depreciated and hence capital (owned by households) does not evolve over
time. Since neither labor nor land is reproducible, the household’s intertemporal optimization
problem can be reduced to point-in-time utility maximization.
To each household, the locational choice includes both the residential site x and the workplace
z. This can be conveniently divided into two steps. In the first step, each household residing in
x while working at z, indexed by (x, z), maximizes utility for a given location pair (x, z), subject
to the budget constraint at every point in time. In the second step, this household maximizes the
value (indirect utility) achieved in the first step, V (x, z), to determine the optimal locational choice
for the household.
Under our set up, these two steps can be reduced to one — maximization of the “net income”,
denoted by I(x, z) for a household residing at x while working at z. Specifically, letting φ > 0 denote
the commuting cost per unit of distance traveled from residence to workplace, this household earns
a wage of w(z), incurs a linear commuting cost of φ|x − z| and pays land rent R(x) on its one
unit of land consumption. Given the utility function specification, its objective is to maximize
u(c). Since u is strictly monotonic in its single argument, this optimization problem is equivalent
to maximization of the net income:
max
x,z
I(x, z) = w(z)− φ|x− z|−R(x). (14)
Notice that locational no-arbitrage requires each household to reach a constant net income (I0)
for any pair of occupied residential and work locations, (x, z):
I(x, z) = I0. (15)
Under this condition with no vacant land, we can compute a household’s bid rent as:
RC(x) = maxz {w(z)− φ|x− z| | I(x, z) = I0} . (16)
Under perfect competition, we can use (14)-(16) to obtain:
RC(x) = w(z)− φ|x− z|− I0 (17)
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for all x where consumers live. This condition implies that no household with location attributes
(x, z) would have an incentive to change either residential or employment sites, because the incre-
mental benefit from changing location exactly oﬀsets the incremental cost.
3 Equilibrium
In this section, we will define the concept of competitive spatial equilibrium associated with a
particular urban configuration τ .
Each firm earns zero profit in equilibrium. Utilizing (11) and (12), the zero profit condition can
be written as:
Yτ (z) = (1− α− β)−1RF (z). (18)
This can be combined with (7) and (13) to yield an ordinary first-order diﬀerential equation for RF
with respect to z. Integrating this diﬀerential equation with respect to z generates firms’ bid rent:
RF (z) =
£
2B2 − (z − μτ )2 − εσ2τ
¤
w(z)−β/(1−α−β)Λ(zτ ) (19)
where Λ(zτ ) = RF (zτ )w(zτ )β/(1−α−β)/
£
2B2 − (zτ − μτ )2 − εσ2τ
¤
depends on a reference location
zτ under a particular urban configuration τ .
We normalize agricultural land rent to be 1.
Definition 1: A competitive spatial equilibrium is a list of quantities {K(z), L(z), Yτ (z)},
prices {r(z), w(z), R(z)}, and population densities {mτ (z), nτ (z)} for z ∈ Ω, together with the set
of firm sites S ⊆ Ω, such that the following conditions are satisfied:
(i) profit maximization: (11) and (12);
(ii) land rent:
R(z) = max {RF (z), RC(z), 1}
R(z) =
⎧
⎨
⎩
RF (z) if mτ (z) > 0
RC(z) if nτ (z) > 0
(20)
R(−B) = R(B) = 1
where RF (z) and RC(z) are determined by (19) and (17), respectively;
(iii) set of firm sites: S = {z | mτ (z) > 0};
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(iv) zero profit: (18);
(v) land market equilibrium: mτ (z) + nτ (z) = 1 for all z ∈ Ω;
(vi) labor market equilibrium:
R
z∈S L(z)mτ (z)dz = N ;
(vii) population identities:
R
z∈Smτ (z)dz =M and
R
z∈Ω nτ (z)dz = N .
While the other conditions are straightforward, the land rents specified in part (ii) deserve
further comment. In particular, (ii) defines the equilibrium market land rent R(z) as the upper
envelope of the two bid rent functions faced by each firm and household. They are RF (z) and
RC(z), respectively, at location z. Whenever a firm or a household resides at a particular location
z, its bid rent must be equal to the equilibrium market land rent. When a location is populated
with positive densities of firms and households, it must be that RF (z) = RC(z) = R(z). Since both
the demand for and the supply of land at the boundary are completely inelastic, the equilibrium
land rent is indeterminate. Thus, one must normalize the boundary land rent in order to obtain a
unique equilibrium rent schedule over the MSA.15
This notion of equilibrium is essentially static in nature. However, the underlying equilibrium
concept is dynamic, representing a time path of endogenous variables over an infinite time horizon.
Agents have perfect foresight and there is no uncertainty. They cannot transfer income between
periods. We have omitted the time index purely for notational simplicity. There is essentially no
connection between time periods aside from population growth (in particular, no state variable is
the result of a choice made by agents in an earlier time period). Thus, the equilibrium problem
reduces to one of a repeated static problem; the only diﬀerence between periods is exogenous
population growth.
We call a competitive spatial equilibrium {{K(z), L(z), Yτ (z)}, {r(z), w(z), R(z)}, {mτ (z),
nτ (z)}, S} symmetric if for almost every z ∈ S, L(z) = L (so all firms use the same quantity of
labor) and every endogenous variable is symmetric around location 0, namely its values at z and
15Condition (vi) of the definition is also worthy of discussion. Details are given in BPW (2003, p. 285). An
aggregate labor market clearance condition is used instead of requiring firm demand at each location to be equal to
the number of consumers who wish to work there. Briefly, the reason is that due to the wage gradient, in equilibrium
consumers are completely indiﬀerent about where their employer is located (as long it is within an area populated
by firms), so it is unnecessary to keep track of local labor market clearance.
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−z are identical. Of course, this implies the same use of labor by all firms. Symmetry is used to
reduce the indeterminacy of equilibrium in our model.
Under symmetry and uniform density of firm land use, we can solve from the labor market
equilibrium condition the equilibrium density of labor demand:
L =
N
M
(21)
Since M is fixed but N is growing at a constant rate ν, L grows over time at the same rate ν.
In the next two sections, we establish conditions under which a particular urban configuration
is supported as a competitive spatial equilibrium. We begin by studying the case of a monocentric
MSA. We then examine how satellite subcenters may form away from the original center and
toward the outskirts of the MSA as population grows. This would result in a core-periphery urban
structure.
4 Equilibrium Urban Configurations
We now establish conditions under which a monocentric or a core-periphery urban configuration is
supported in a symmetric competitive spatial equilibrium.16
4.1 The Monocentric Urban Configuration
As illustrated in Figure 1, in the case of a monocentric MSA (τ = M), S = [−q, q], μM = 0, and
σM = q = M2 . All households reside in the outskirts [−B,−q] ∪ [q,B] and commute to the firm
cluster S to work. In equilibrium, the land rent at the fringe must satisfy: RC(−B) = RC(B) = 1.
In this urban configuration, an important reference point is zM = q = M2 , at which RF (q) = RC(q)
(similar properties hold for location −q).
Next, we shall impose two conditions on exogenous parameters so that the monocentric config-
uration is supported as an equilibrium.
Condition N: N(t)M >
β
1−α−β .
Condition M: φ
³
1 + N(t)M
´
< M(1+t
N(t)
2
)
2

M+N(t)
2
2
−(1+ε)(M
2
)2
.
16For ranges of parameters other than those studied in this section, other equilibrium configurations can arise. For
example, when commuting cost is high, there is a completely mixed equilibrium configuration where consumers work
at their residence and there is no commuting.
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We can then establish:
Theorem 1. (Existence) Under Conditions N and M, there is a symmetric competitive spatial
equilibrium with a monocentric urban configuration in which all firms are clustered around
the city center S = [−M2 ,
M
2 ] and all households reside at the outskirts of the MSA. The equilibrium
wage schedule and the equilibrium land rent are:
w(x) =
β
1− α− β
M
N
∙
1 +
µ
1− α
β
¶
φ
N
2
¸
− φ |x| (22)
R(z) =
⎧
⎨
⎩
RF (z) for z ∈ S
RC(z) for z ∈ Ω \ S
(23)
where RF (z) and RC(z) are given by
RF (z) =
h
2
¡M+N
2
¢2 − ε(M2 )2 − z2iΛ(q)n
β
1−α−β
M
N
h
1 +
³
1−α
β
´
φN2
i
− φ |z|
oβ/(1−α−β) (24)
RC(z) = 1 + φ(B − |z|) (25)
and Λ(q) = 1+φ
N
2
2(M+N2 )
2−(1+ε)(M
2
)2
h
β
1−α−β
M
N
¡
1 + φN2
¢iβ/(1−α−β)
.
By examining the equilibrium wage and land rent schedules, {w(x)} and {R(z)} pinned down
in the theorem above, one can see that both are decreasing in the distance from the city center 0.
Moreover, an increase in the household population (N) for a given mass of firms reduces the wage
rate at each location, while an increase in the degree of penalty on overall firm dispersion (ε) has
no eﬀect on wages and an ambiguous eﬀect on land rents.
In order to support the monocentric urban configuration, it is required that each household
has an incentive to work away from home because by working for a firm closer to the city center,
the incremental gain from a higher wage dominates the induced cost of commuting. Condition
N guarantees RF (0) > RC(0) while Condition M guarantees |R0F (q)| > |R0C(q)|. These together
ensure a locational equilibrium choice of workplace and residence under the monocentric urban
configuration in which the equilibrium land rent is the upper envelope of firms’ and households’
bid rents. Thus, Conditions N and M are necessary and suﬃcient for supporting a symmetric
competitive spatial equilibrium with a monocentric urban configuration.
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4.2 Equilibrium with a Core-Periphery Urban Configuration
As illustrated in figure 2, in the case of a core-periphery MSA (τ = C), S = [−q4,−q3]∪ [−q1, q1]∪
[q3, q4], μC = 0, and σC = B − N8 . All households residing in [−q2,−q1] ∪ [q1, q2] commute to
the core SC = [−q1, q1] to work, whereas those in [−B,−q4] ∪ [−q3,−q2] commute to the satellite
subcenter to the left of the core SLP = [−q4,−q3] and those in [q2, q3]∪ [q4, B] commute to the right
satellite subcenter SRP = [q3, q4], respectively (D =
3
4B). At a symmetric equilibrium, RC(−B) =
RC(−q2) = RC(q2) = RC(B) = 1 and there are now two important reference points zC ∈ {q1, q4}
defining the boundary between firms and households, at which RF (q1) = RC(q1) and RF (q4) =
RC(q4) (noting that the properties of bid rents at q3 are just a mirror image of those at q4).
We now define Γ(N(t)) = 2
³
M+N(t)
2
´2
− ε
³
4M+3N(t)
8
´2
. Consider,
Condition C: φ
³
1 + N(t)M
´
< min
(
M
2

1+φN(t)
4

Γ(N(t))−(M4 )
2 ,

4M+3N(t)
4

1+φN(t)
8

Γ(N(t))−

4M+3N(t)
8
2
)
.
We can then establish:
Theorem 2. Under Conditions N and C, there is a symmetric competitive spatial equilibrium
with a core-periphery urban configuration in which:
(i) half of the firms are clustered in the core, SC = [−M4 ,
M
4 ], whereas the remaining half are
symmetrically clustered within the two satellite subcenters, SLP =
h
−4M+3N(t)8 , −
2M+3N(t)
8
i
and SRP =
h
2M+3N(t)
8 ,
4M+3N(t)
8
i
;
(ii) all households residing in inner locations of the MSA,
h
−M+N(t)4 , −
M
4
i
∪
h
M
4 ,
M+N(t)
4
i
,
commute to the core SC to work; those in outer left locations,
h
−M+N(t)2 , −
4M+3N(t)
8
i
∪h
−2M+3N(t)8 , −
M+N(t)
4
i
, commute to the distance-minimizing satellite subcenter SLP to work;
whereas those in outer right locations,
h
M+N(t)
4 ,
2M+3N(t)
8
i
∪
h
4M+3N(t)
8 ,
M+N(t)
2
i
, commute
to the distance-minimizing satellite subcenter SRP to work.
The equilibrium wage schedule and the equilibrium land rent are:
w(x) =
⎧
⎨
⎩
β
1−α−β
M
N
h
1+
³
1−α
β
´
φN2
i
− φ
¡B
2+ |x|
¢
for x ∈
£
-3B4 , -
M
4
¤
∪
£M
4 ,
3B
4
¤
β
1−α−β
M
N
h
1+
³
1−α
β
´
φN2
i
− φ |x| for x ∈ £-B, -3B4 ¤ ∪ £3B4 , B¤ (26)
R(z) =
⎧
⎨
⎩
RF (z) for z ∈ S
RC(z) for z ∈ Ω \ S
(27)
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where RF (z) and RC(z) are given by,
RF (z) =
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
[Γ(N)−z2]Λ1(q1)q
β
1−α−β
M
N
k
1+

1−α
β

φN
2
l
−φ(B2 +|z|)
rβ/(1−α−β) for z ∈
£
−B2 ,
B
2
¤
[Γ(N)−z2]Λ2(q4)q
β
1−α−β
M
N
k
1+

1−α
β

φN
2
l
−φ|z|
rβ/(1−α−β) for z ∈
£
−B,−B2
¤
∪
£B
2 , B
¤ (28)
RC(z) =
⎧
⎨
⎩
1 + φ(B2 − |z|) for z ∈
£
−3B4 ,−
M
4
¤
∪
£M
4 ,
3B
4
¤
1 + φ(B − |z|) for z ∈ £−B,−3B4 ¤ ∪ £3B4 , B¤ (29)
and Λ1(q1) =
1+φN
4
Γ(N)−(M4 )
2
h
β
1−α−β
M
N
¡
1 + φN2
¢
− φN4
iβ/(1−α−β)
,
Λ2(q4) =
1+φN
8
Γ(N)−( 4M+3N8 )
2
h
β
1−α−β
M
N
¡
1 + φN2
¢
− φ3N8
iβ/(1−α−β)
.
Under the core-periphery urban configuration, the equilibrium wage and land rent schedules,
{w(x)} and {R(z)}, are decreasing in the distance from the respective centers of the core and the
two satellite subcenters. Again, an increase in the household population (N) for a given mass of
firms reduces the wage rate at each location, whereas an increase in the degree of penalty on overall
firm dispersion (ε) has no eﬀect on wages and an ambiguous eﬀect on land rents.
To support this urban configuration, households need to have an incentive to work away from
home. Moreover, by working for a closer firm in the respective clusters instead of a firm in the core,
the incremental gain from a higher wage dominates the induced cost of commuting. Under the
level and slope conditions (Conditions N and C), a locational equilibrium choice of workplace and
residence under the core-periphery urban configuration implies that the equilibrium land rent is
the upper envelope of firms’ and households’ bid rents. Conditions N and C are therefore necessary
and suﬃcient for supporting a symmetric competitive spatial equilibrium with a core-periphery
urban configuration.
5 A Transition from Monocentric to Core-Periphery Urban Con-
figurations
We are now ready to examine how satellite subcenters may form away from the original center
and toward the outskirts of the MSA as population grows. This results in a core-periphery urban
structure. Due to the complexity of the relevant conditions (particularly Conditions M vs. C),
we are unable to characterize this transition analytically. Instead we elaborate our findings using
numerical exercises.
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Normalize N(0) = 1 and set M = 0.1. We select the following parameter values:
(i) (Production Technology) α = 0.3, β = 0.5, ε = 2.25;
(ii) (Commuting) φ = 0.005;
(iii) (Population Growth) ν = 2%.
It is easily seen that Condition N always holds. We can further check Conditions M and C to
conclude:
(i) (0 ≤ t < t1) The MSA features a monocentric urban configuration (τ =M).
(ii) (t1 ≤ t < t2) The monocentric configuration disappears and a core-periphery urban configura-
tion forms in the MSA (τ = C) where the geographical centers of the two satellite subcenters
continue to move outward at rate ν.
According to our calculations, t1 = 19.84 and t2 = 27.09. We assume that the initial equilibrium
configuration, at time t = 0, is monocentric. As population grows, eventually the monocentric
equilibrium disappears (at t1), and the core-periphery urban configuration appears and persists (at
least until time t2). We do not make any claims about uniqueness of symmetric competitive spatial
equilibrium. Particularly, the reader should be warned that there are other types of equilibria not
considered here; we may easily have more equilibria coexisting with the ones we have studied.17
One may then inquire what happens when t ≥ t2. This is speculation on our part, based on some
numerical exercises. In this case, neither of the two urban configurations that we have considered
can arise. When t is not too large, the MSA becomes either: (a) mixed with firms and workers
both living at some locations or (b) features more than two satellite subcenters.18 When t is very
large, ultimately diminishing returns to the number of subcenters dominates as the city expands
out due to the reduction in overall knowledge spillovers. In this case, new cores will be formed.
These critical times t1 and t2 change as the population growth rates vary:
17Since we are using the guess and verify method for analyzing equilibrium, it is necessary to guess.
18A plausible core-periphery urban structure is one with 2 larger subcenters centered at − 3B5 and
3B
5 , and 2
smaller subcenters centered at − 9B10 and
9B
10 . Then the core, [−
M
5 ,
M
5 ], has firms of mass
2M
5 and employees residing
in [− 2B5 ,−
M
5 ] and [
M
5 ,
2B
5 ]. Each of the two larger satellite subcenters hosts firms of mass
M
5 and employees residing
in [− 4B5 ,−(
3B
5 +
M
10 )] ∪ [−(
3B
5 −
M
10 ),−
2B
5 ] and [
2B
5 ,
3B
5 −
M
10 ] ∪ [
3B
5 +
M
10 ,
4B
5 ]. Each of the two smaller satellite
subcenters contains firms of mass M10 and employees residing in [−B,−(
9B
10 +
M
20 )]∪ [−(
9B
10 −
M
20 ),−
4B
5 ] and [
4B
5 ,
9B
10 −
M
20 ] ∪ [
9B
10 +
M
20 , B].
20
ν 1% 5% 10%
t1 39.69 7.94 3.97
t2 54.18 10.84 5.42
Thus, if a city grows slowly (say, at 1%), it may maintain a monocentric configuration for almost
40 years and have two satellite subcenters forming for another 15 years. If a city grows fast (say,
at a 10% rate, similar to Las Vegas, Phoenix and San Antonio), the monocentric urban structure
may quickly fall in as few as 4 years with two satellite subcenters forming only for about a year
and a half before more satellite subcenters develop. This process may be expedited if other urban
congestion factors are taken into account. Thus, one may not expect to find many U.S. cities
featuring a monocentric urban structure today, corroborating the empirical findings in McMillen
and Smith (2003).
Moreover, McMillen and Smith (2003) suggest that the critical population size for subcenters
to form (without accounting for congestion factors) is about 2.68 million. By setting N(0) = 1.8
million, we can reproduce this critical population as N(19.84) = 2.68 million. Thus, our model is
rich enough to conduct calibration analysis.
We can analyze numerically comparative statics with respect to commuting cost as well as
production-spillover and dispersion-penalty parameters of the model. Our results, which are ro-
bust to plausible variations in the parameters, indicate that the speed of forming satellite subcenters
increases with the unit commuting cost (φ) but decreases with the degree of penalty on the disper-
sion of firms for knowledge spillovers (ε). While the latter may be diﬃcult to measure in practice,
the long commute from the Staples Center to Disneyland and the Rose Bowl may explain why Los
Angeles features as many as 46 subcenters.
6 Concluding Remarks
We have examined conditions necessary and suﬃcient for the equilibrium structure of a closed
city (with exogenous but growing population, an endogenous city boundary, and with localization
externalities between firms) to be monocentric or to have subcenters. To relate the model to
city growth, we have postulated an exogenous population growth process, where population is the
only state variable that changes over time. Beginning with a monocentric configuration, there is
eventually a transition to an equilibrium with employment subcenters. There is no need for firms
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to receive a share of rents for this to happen, nor is a government or a developer necessary. We have
actually biased the externality against subcenter formation, relying only on distance to the center
of firm locations rather than on the local density of firms around any given firm. From a technical
viewpoint, for low populations, we select the monocentric equilibrium as an initial condition, to
see the evolution of a city. With high populations, the equilibrium with subcenters appears and
survives while the monocentric equilibrium disappears.
There are many more questions raised by this work than we have answered. As population rises
further, can an equilibrium urban configuration with more subcenters coexist with an equilibrium
featuring a mixed configuration in which the firms and consumers co-locate? With an equilibrium
featuring subcenters, will subcenters multiply at an accelerated rate as population grows? If more
subcenters are formed, will the configuration be consistent with central place theory, and is the
theory of the open city model in this context similar? It may be of particular interest to examine
whether the main findings obtained under our competitive spatial equilibrium setup diﬀer from
those established by Abdel-Rahman and Wang (1995) within the search equilibrium framework.
One may study the welfare properties of the model, particularly comparing the level of community
welfare achieved under each urban configuration. In our model, all firms earn zero profit and all
households gain identical net income in equilibrium. Thus, the total land rent collected by the
absentee landlord alone determines the welfare of an MSA. Due to the complexity of the bid rent
functions, this welfare comparison cannot be conducted analytically, but numerical exercises may
be performed for such purposes. Finally, the model could be useful for examining the recent work on
urban growth boundaries, such as Brueckner (2005) and Anas and Rhee (2006) that has congestion.
Whether boundaries cause welfare to go up or down in the second-best context (with a congestion
externality) seems to depend on whether the city in the model is assumed to be monocentric or
polycentric. In our model, we do not need to make an assumption about the urban configuration,
but rather allow it to be determined endogenously. One may thus revisit this welfare issue in
the second-best context (in the presence of a production externality), taking into account the
endogenous formation of subcenters. We leave all of these topics to future research, particularly for
our students and grandstudents in a cluster of urban economists with positive knowledge spillovers.
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Appendix
In this appendix, we prove the main theorems derived in the paper.
Proof of Theorem 1: Since the MSA is symmetric with respect to the geographic center, our
focus is on the right half of the city, [0, B]. Evaluating (17) at B and applying RC(B) = 1, we can
solve the wage schedule as:
w(z) = 1 + I0 + φ (B − z) (30)
and the equilibrium bid rent schedule for households (x, z) as:
RC(x) = 1 + φ (B − z)− φ|x− z| (31)
Evaluating this at x = q and using equilibrium land rent condition RF (q) = RC(q), we get:
RC(q) = RC(B) + φ (B − q) = 1 + φ(B − q) = RF (q) (32)
Substituting (30) and (32) into (19) yields the equilibrium bid rent schedule for firms over S = [0, q]:
RF (z) =
2B2 − z2 − εq2
[1 + I0 + φ(B − z)]β/(1−α−β)
Λ(q) (33)
where Λ(q) = 1+φ(B−q)2B2−(1+ε)q2 [1 + I0 + φ(B − q)]
β/(1−α−β).
Combining (12), (18) and (30), one can evaluate at z ∈ [0, q] firms’ equilibrium land rent
payment:
RF (z) =
1− α− β
β
[1 + I0 + φ(B − z)]L (34)
Utilizing (32) and (21), we can solve for the piece of the expression in brackets, namely endogenously
determined net income:
1 + I0 + φB =
β
1− α− β
M
N
µ
1 + φ
N
2
¶
+ φ
M
2
or,
1 + I0 + φB =
β
1− α− β
M
N
∙
1 +
µ
1− α
β
¶
φ
N
2
¸
(35)
With this and accounting appropriately for the left-half of the city [−B, 0], we can obtain (22),
(25), and (24). Moreover, we can substitute (21) and (35) into (34) to derive:
RF (0) =
1− α− β
β
N
M
(1 + I0 + φB) = 1 +
µ
1− α
β
¶
φ
N
2
(36)
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From (31) and (36), one can see that RF (0) > RC(0) if and only if Condition N holds.
Further diﬀerentiating (33) gives:
R0F (z)
RF (z)
= −
∙
2z
2B2 − z2 − εq2 −
β
1− α− β
φ
1 + I0 + φ(B − z)
¸
(37)
Evaluating this expression at q and manipulating, we have:
R0F (q) = −
"
M(1 + φN2 )
2
¡M+N
2
¢2 − (1 + ε)(M2 )2 − φ
N
M
#
To guarantee QM(z) > 0 for all z ∈ S = [0, q], we need:
2
µ
M +N
2
¶2
− (1 + ε)(M
2
)2 > 0
which is implied by Condition M (noting also that this inequality implies that the right hand side
of the inequality in Condition M is positive). In competitive spatial equilibrium, the following land
rent slope condition must be met: |R0F (q)| > |R0C(q)| = φ, which is equivalent to Condition M.
When the inequality in Condition M is met, the above inequality must be met as well and the bid
rent must be downward-sloping, i.e., R0F (z) < 0 for all z ∈ S = [0, q]. ¥
Proof of Theorem 2: Following a procedure similar to that in the Proof of Theorem 1 and
focusing on the right half of the city [0, B], we can evaluate (17) at q2 = B2 and q2 = B, and then
use RC(q2) = RC(B) = 1 to obtain:
w(z) =
⎧
⎨
⎩
1 + I0 + φ(q2 − z)
1 + I0 + φ(B − z)
for z ∈ [q1,D]
for z ∈ [D,B]
(38)
RC(q1) = 1 + φ(q2 − q1) = RF (q1) (39)
RC(q4) = 1 + φ(B − q4) = RF (q4) (40)
Substitution of (38), (39) and (40) into (19) gives:
RF (z) =
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
k
2B2−z2−ε(B−N8 )
2
l
Λ1(q1)
[1+I0+φ(B2 −z)]
β/(1−α−β) for z ∈ [0, q2]
k
2B2−z2−ε(B−N8 )
2
l
Λ2(q4)
[1+I0+φ(B−z)]β/(1−α−β)
for z ∈ [q2, B]
(41)
where Λ1(q1) =
1+φ(B
2
−q1)
2B2−(q1)2−ε(B−N8 )
2
£
1 + I0 + φ(B2 − q1)
¤β/(1−α−β)
Λ2(q4) =
1+φ(B−q4)
2B2−(q4)2−ε(B−N8 )
2 [1 + I0 + φ(B − q4)]β/(1−α−β).
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Using (12), (18), (21) and (30), we get:
RF (z) =
⎧
⎨
⎩
1−α−β
β
N
M
£
1 + I0 + φ(B2 − z)
¤
for z ∈ [q1,D]
1−α−β
β
N
M [1 + I0 + φ(B − z)] for z ∈ [D,B]
(42)
Under this urban configuration, 1 + I0 + φB is still determined by (35). We can thus derive (26),
(28) and (29), as well as (36). Since RF (0) and RC(0) are the same as in Theorem 1, Condition
N still applies to the current case, which is necessary and suﬃcient to ensure RF (0) > RC(0).
Additionally, however, we must have: RF (D) > RC(D). Manipulations similar to those used in
the Proof of Theorem 1 yield:
RF (D) =
1− α− β
β
N
M
[1 + I0 + φ (B −D)] = 1 +
µ
1− α
β
¶
φ
N
8
RC(D) = 1 + φ (B −D) = 1 + φ
N
8
Since 1− α− β > 0, we have 1−αβ > 1 and hence RF (D) > RC(D) always holds. That is, there is
no additional level condition required for the core-periphery urban configuration to arise.
We must further check slope conditions. Diﬀerentiating (33) implies:
R0F (z)
RF (z)
=
⎧
⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
−
∙
2z
2B2−z2−ε(B−N8 )
2 − β1−α−β
φ
1+I0+φ(B2 −z)
¸
for z ∈ [0, q2]
−
∙
2z
2B2−z2−ε(B−N8 )
2 − β1−α−β
φ
1+I0+φ(B−z)
¸
for z ∈ [q2, B]
(43)
Evaluating this at q1 and q4, one obtains:
R0F (q1) = −
∙
M
2
(1+φN
4
)
2(M+N2 )
2−(M
4
)2−ε( 4M+3N8 )
2 − φNM
¸
R0F (q4) = −
" 
4M+3N(t)
4

1+φN(t)
8

2

M+N(t)
2
2
−(1+ε)

4M+3N(t)
8
2 − φNM
#
Condition C is not only necessary and suﬃcient to guarantee both |R0F (q1)| > |R0C(q1)| = φ and
|R0F (q4)| > |R0C(q4)| = φ, but also suﬃcient to guarantee QC(z) > 0 for all z ∈ S and R0F (z) < 0
for all z ∈ [0, q1] ∪ [D, q4]. ¥
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Figure 1:  Monocentric Urban Configuration
(a)  Distribution of Firms and Households
 
      
(b)  Bid Rent and Equilibrium Land Rent Schedules
  
  Figure 2:  Core-Periphery Urban Configuration
(a)  Distribution of Firms and Households
(b)  Bid Rent and Equilibrium Land Rent Schedules
